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REMARKS ON 'PROBABILITY' IN LAW:
MOSTLY, A CASENOTE AND A BOOK
REVIEW
Robert Birmingham*
Professor Posner's theme in his Article on the right to privacy, as
in his comprehensive studies of law, is that courts and lawyers can
use economics to understand and improve the process and the re-
sults of legal decisionmaking. In his indirect response to Posner,
Professor Birmingham comments on other attempts to inject nonle-
gal terms into legal analysis.
K yburg, beginning a paper: "I wish to argue here that 'probabil-
ity' occurs but rarely and peripherally in scientific theories."'
But 'probability', the word, occurs often in legal theories, maybe
most often when these theories are believed to be most scientific.
In particular, the literature of law and economics is full of it.Three observations: (1) philosophers and others have recently
done much work on the foundations of probability, so that these are
confused; (2) 'probability' is interesting etymologically, in a way
related to law; (3) almost always at law, 'probability' is used with-
out regard to, or in ignorance of, (1) and (2).
Various problems, perhaps also opportunities, come from this; it
is these I talk about. I do not present a sustained argument, but
separate discussions, loosely connected in that each has to do with
'probability' as it is related to law. Much may be done without being
very technical.
I.
The Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Flores. ..
took up the most advanced position. "The fundamental spirit
of democracy," he told a meeting of the Faculty of Law a few
days after the revolution, "proclaims that it is better that a
hundred desperate criminals escape than that one innocent
man be lodged in jail."
-John K. Galbraith 2
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. A.B., J.D., Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh;
LL.M., Harvard Law School.
I Kyburg, Chance, 5 J. PHIL. LOGIC 355, 355 (1976).
2 J. GALBRArm, ThE TRIUMPH 126 (1968).
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First, a pretty use of 'probability', introduced into law, so far as I
know, by Kaplan.3 A person accused of a crime did it or not and may
be found to have done it or not: four outcomes, each with a satisfac-
tion, say to society. If the satisfaction, or lack of it, is with the
decision, it maybe only matters if one gets it wrong.
Actuality
innocent guilty
innocent 0 s2
Verdict
guilty s21  0
In general, s12  S21: it is worse, say, to punish an innocent person
than to let a guilty person go free. Be this as it may, if p is the
probability a person is guilty, it is a matter of indifference, in terms
of satisfaction, whether the person is punished if
PS12 = (1 - P) s8,.
For each verdict, one multiplies the loss from mistakenly reaching
it, s,2 or S21, by the probability of doing so, p or 1 - p: thus expected
(dis)satisfaction. If the products are equal, how one decides does not
matter.
4
If one determines the p at which the products are equal, one
determines the ratio of S12 to s2 1 and finds out something about
society, or persons in it. Happily, a study does this, giving, for
jurors, mean probabilities from .74 for petty larceny to .92 for man-
slaughter; murder comes out .86.5 So much accords well with earlier
estimates of the ratio of S12 to S21, mostly rhetorical, parodied by
the epigraph.'
3 Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968).
1 As I explain better in part II, the probability involved is subjective: the defendant did
it or did not, so objectively the probability is 1 or 0; but a juror is not given this.
Some subjectivists have asked, 'if the coin is flipped but the outcome is hidden from
you, (a) wouldn't you still bet as though heads is a 50-50 chance, and, if so, (b) would
you still insist on using the familiar (non-Bayesian frequentist) language that, once the
coin is flipped, the probability is no longer 2 that the coin may come up "heads", but
is either 0 or 1 (you know not which) that it now is heads?' My answer to both questions
is yes.
Kiefer, The Foundations of Statistics-Are There Any?, 36 SvNTHESF 161, 173 (1977).
5 Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and
the Classroom, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 319, 328 (1971).
6 Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Prac-
tices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 881-82 (1968).
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Hale: 5-1
Blackstone: 10-1
Fortescue: 20-1
In *all this there is, of course, the presumption that some innocent
persons are punished. The prospect was met with equanimity by
Paley, who argued that "courts of justice should not be deterred"
by "the mere possibility of confounding the innocent with the
guilty" but "ought rather to reflect, that he who falls by a mistaken
sentence, may be considered as falling for his country."7 It wasn't
his ox.
II.
Suppose one takes a well-shuffled pack of cards, it is quite
likely or not unlikely that the top card will prove to be a dia-
mond: the odds are only three to one against; but most people
would not say that it is quite likely to be the nine of diamonds
for the odds are then fifty-one to one against. On the other hand
I think that most people would say that there is a serious possi-
bility or a real danger of its being turned up first and, of course,
it is on the cards.
-Lord Reid'
A case, done badly: The Heron 11 (Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd.).'
The plaintiffs chartered the defendant's ship, the Heron II, to carry
3000 tons of Hungarian sugar from Constanza, on the Black Sea, to
Basrah. (One has to get into the spirit of the thing: Basrah, at the
head of the Persian Gulf, was founded as a garrison town of the
conquering Arabs in 638;10 that is, it's not, say, Cleveland.) The
voyage, which should have taken twenty days, took eleven more, at
least nine of them due to deviations in breach of contract. (The ship
left Constanza 1 November 1960, arrived at Basrah 2 December
1960; but by contract it might have arrived for loading as late as 10
November.) The plaintiffs intended to sell the sugar on arrival of
the ship at Basrah, and did so. The defendants did not know the
plaintiffs intended to do this but knew there was a market for sugar
" W. PALEY, Moral and Political Philosophy, in 3 THE Wows OF WuIlL PALEY, D.D. 315,
315 (1838).
The Heron II (Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd.), [1967] 3 All E.R. 686, 694-95 (H.L.).
Id. at 686.
1 M. HoDGSON, THE VENTURE OF Isi.A 202, 205, 208 (1974).
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in Basrah and must have known the plaintiffs were not going to eat
the sugar themselves. During the days the ship was delayed, the
price of sugar in Basrah fell from £32 10s. per ton to £31 2s. 9d. per
ton, presumably at least in part because another ship arrived there,
as scheduled, delivering 8000 tons of Formosan sugar. (Gilmore says
the market "collapsed";" he overstates the change.)
The defendant admitted liability of £172, mostly interest at six
percent on the value of the sugar for nine days. The plaintiffs sought
loss-of-market damages and recovered them. In -addition to the
£172, the umpire awarded more than £4000, because of the decline
in the price of sugar during the delay. The trial court set aside the
second part of the award, but the Court of Appeals reinstated it;"
the House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The House of Lords, of course, decided the case under the rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., ac-
cording to the usual course of things, from such breach of con-
tract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.,'
With some variation among the judges, the reasoning went this way:
The defendant, if he had thought about it, must have realized (1)
that it was, say, not unlikely that the sugar would be sold in the
market on arrival, and (2) that market prices change. But, in spite
of a tendency of the price of sugar at Basrah "to decline during
October and November to a low point in about December,"' 4 the
defendant might properly have taken there to be "an even chance
that the fluctuation would be downwards."' 5
As the judges understood it, the issue, under Hadley v.
Baxendale, was how probable what happened had to be. Their judg-
ments about past cases, very roughly:
11 G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 84 (1974).
12 [1966] 2 All E.R. 593 (C.A.).
," 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
" [1967] 3 All E.R. at 697.
" Id. at 689.
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(mere) possibility
on the cards
Asquith, L.J., in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) serious possibility
Ltd. v. Newman Industries, Ltd. , -real dangergrave risk
liable to result
Alderson, B., in Hadley v. Baxendale-*.not unlikely
likely
Viscount Dunedin, in Re R. & H. Hall, Ltd., and quite likely
W.H. Pim (Junior) & Co. 's ArbitrationI -->even chancemore than even chance
odds on chance
Mellish, L.J., in The Parana" -- reasonably certain
virtually certain
certain
inevitable
Hadley, of course, was rightly decided; the problem was to interpret
it. (A particular problem is a willingness to suppose, say, that some-
thing is reasonably certain if it is reasonably certain that it is rea-
sonably certain-especially, that it is not unlikely if there is an even
chance that it is not unlikely. See part IV.)
The reasoning of the judges, burdened by introspection about
ordinary language, as by Lord Reid, above," mostly displays the
disadvantages of a classical education as to this sort of thing. The
opinions take up better than thirty pages; one waits, desperately,
for somebody to say 'about .1' and be done with it. (As Dawson and
Harvey see it, the opinions are "a stunning display of prolixity"; 2
they disliked reading them and relieve the student from doing so.)
This use of ordinary language is bad by itself, but there is a more
substantial difficulty.
In 1931, somebody named Heisel, who disliked irrational
numbers, tried to prove ir is a rational number, 256/81, like this:2'
Using 256/81 for 7r, he calculated circumferences and areas of circles
with diameters from one to ten. In each instance, the ratio of the
area to the circumference was r/2, as it should be. Q.E.D.
Is [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 540.
1 [1928] All E.R. 763, 766, 767 (H.L.).
2 P.D. 118, 123 (C.A. 1877).
" See text accompanying note 8 supra.
J. DAwsoN & W. HARvEY, CASES AND COMMNT ON CoNTmAcm 70 (3d ed. 1977).
C. HEiSEL, BEHOLD! THE GRAND PROBLEM No LONGER UNSOLVED: THE Cmctz SQUARED
BEYOND REFwtATION (1931).
1978]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Beckmann, who reports this, remarks, "he would have obtained the
same consistency had he set 7r equal to the birthdate of his
grandmother. 2 2 The judges in The Heron 11 do something like what
Heisel did.
In cases like The Heron II, the defendant has breached a contract
with the plaintiff, with consequent loss to the latter. As the judges
see it, the defendant is liable for the loss if the event that caused it
is not unlikely. Reconstructing a bit, one gets a function from
events, understood to be particulars, to real numbers from 0 to 1,
giving the probabilities of these events. If the number that is the
value of this function for the appropriate event as argument of it is,
for instance, above .1, the defendant is liable for the loss; otherwise
he is not.
Unhappily, events, being particulars, do not have probabilities or
do not have probabilities that one can use this way. The particular
event that caused the loss to the plaintiffs in The Heron 11 was the
arrival of the ship with the Formosan sugar, the sale of this sugar
in the market at Basrah, etc. In a sense, if everything that happens
is determined to happen, the probability of this event is 1. But it is
not this sense that matters. What matters is the probability of this
event in the light of what the defendant knew or should have known:
this probability is 0. The first mate of the ship with the Formosan
sugar was, perhaps, Lars, a Norwegian. If the first mate had been
Ch'ien-fu, a Chinese, who did not exist, but might have existed, the
event would have been different. So, too, would it have been differ-
ent if the ship had arrived 7r seconds later than it did. There are
uncountably many possible first mates and times of arrival, each
equally likely, so far as the defendant knew or should have known.
Again, for the defendant, the probability of the particular event
happening that did happen is 0.?
The probabilities that matter belong not to events as such, but
to events under descriptions.
Our ordinary talk of events, of causes and effects, requires con-
stant use of the idea of different descriptions of the same event.
When it is pointed out that striking the match was not suffi-
P. BECKMANN, A HISTORY OF -r (PI) 175 (2d ed. 1971).
21 Illustration: if one shoots a machine gun accurately at a target of area 1 and idealizes a
bit, so that bullets are point-particles, a region of area 0 is hit each time, that is, the region
of all and only the points hit in the long run; the rest of the target, still with area 1, is not
hit at all. van Fraassen, Relative Frequencies, 34 SYNTHESE 133, 135 (1977).
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cient to light it, what is not sufficient is not the event, but the
description of it-it was a dry match, and so on.2'
So what did happen, described as the arrival of a ship, had a partic-
ular probability; described as the arrival of a ship carrying sugar,
or carrying 8000 or more tons of sugar, it had different, lower proba-
bilities.
The catch is, of course, that there is no correct description. In The
Heron II, Lord Morris understood the description that counted to
be 'a loss by reason of a fall in the market price of sugar at Basrah'
and believed the event, thus described, "was liable to result or at
least not unlikely to result. '" But a change in the market price was
virtually certain, and a fall in the market price of four percent or
more unlikely but a serious possibility. And maybe it should matter
whether the market price fell because a ship came in, or because the
wife of the trader Abui-Nuwfs, until then even-tempered, threw a
pot at him, so that he decided to sell out and go to Kuwait. The
court spends thirty pages deciding which probability is important,
but presupposes the description, equally determinative, under
which the event is given a probability to be compared with it. Its
presupposition, itself arbitrary, pretty much decides the case.
(As Davidson does,2 1I take events to be particulars. If I take them
to be not particulars, but properties, perhaps properties of points in
space-time, the problem does not go away but is described differ-
ently: the judges must decide among properties, that is, events in-
stead of descriptions of them.2 They still don't do it.)
II.
The Court: Now, if that is the case, you must-before you
hear any evidence at all-you must start on the theory and
believe that this man is innocent. But as soon as they produce
proof which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that he is
guilty, then you can feel otherwise. Do you understand that?
The Juror: Yes.
-Voir dire conducted
by Charles R. Garry
in People v. Newtons
"Davidson, The Logical Form of Action Sentences, in THE LOGIC OF Dacsio. AD AcnoN
81, 93 (N. Rescher ed. 1967).
21 [1967] 3 All E.R. at 705.
2 Davidson, supra note 24.
27A. GoLMAn, A THEORY OF HumAN ActoN (1970).
2MNIMzING RACISM IN JuRY TRmS 92 (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
1978]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
I go back to the discussion of determining guilt or innocence in
part I. In a sense, again, the accused either did it or did not, so the
(objective) probability he did it is either 1 or 0. But the probability
that matters is subjective: if a juror believes, for instance, that the
probability the accused did it is .9 or better, he votes to convict him.
I asked above what the juror does, given the probability the accused
did it; I ask here how the juror arrives at this probability.
In part, it is easy. A form of Bayes's theorem," or an application
of it, is
P (E I guilty)
P (guilty I E) - P (E) P (guilty)
Read: 'The probability a person is guilty, given evidence E, is the
prior probability he is guilty, multiplied by the probability of E
given he is guilty, divided by the prior probability of E.' The idea
is that the juror starts with a probability of guilt, which is changed
as he gets evidence. Lempert ° discusses Bayes's theorem in an in-
teresting way, but I give my own examples.
Suppose a person accused of being a witch has "a frightened
look. ' 3 ' If the prior probability of being a witch is p, but everybody
accused of this has, not unreasonably, a frightened look, the proba-
bility of her being a witch is still p,
P (guilty IE) = =
and one hasn't found out anything. (The law did not look at it this
way. As a handbook for inquisitors put it, that a person accused of
being a witch has "a frightened look" is "a light indication" of guilt,
by itself "sufficient warrant for proceeding to the torture. 32 )
Again, suppose a prosecutor produces "two qualified witnesses to
testify that they heard the sounds of a violent struggle in a house,
that they saw the accused emerge from the house with a blood-
stained knife in his hand, and that the house was empty save for
the body of the victim."33 If the prior probability the accused did it
is p, and the probability of the evidence given he did it is 1, but the
evidence is otherwise not probable, perhaps .01, then the probability
he did it goes up a hundredfold:
The classic treatment of it is L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954).
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1021 (1977).
" H. BOGUET, AN EXAMEN OF WITCHES 223 (1929).
2 Id.
N. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1969).
."[Vol. 12:535
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1
P (guilty I E) = 1 p = lOOp.
(But, in Islamic law, "Shari'a doctrine forbids the judge to draw
from this evidence the conclusion that the accused was the killer,"
this evidence being "what is termed 'suspicion.' "31)
The epigraph is an interjection by the judge in the questioning by
Garry of a prospective juror.
Q. Well, my question is: As you sit there right now, do you
believe that Huey Newton shot and killed, stabbed, whatever
it was, Officer Frey?
A. I don't know whether he shot him or not. That I can't
say.
The Court: Mr. Strauss, you see, under our law there is a
presumption of innocence to start with. When you start the
case the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and it is up to
the People, the prosecution, to prove to you beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant is guilty. Do you understand
that?
The Juror: Yes.
The Court: So, now, not having heard any evidence,
you must start with a presumption of innocence. Do you know
what I mean by presumption? You must say, "As far as I know
the man is innocent." Do you understand that?
The Juror: Yes.5
It ended badly.
Mr. Garry: As Huey Newton sits here next to me now, in
your opinion is he absolutely innocent?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't believe it, do you?
A. No.
The Court: Challenge is allowed.36
In light of Bayes's theorem, one obvious way to interpret the
presumption of innocence is to take it to require that the prior prob-
ability a person is guilty, the probability a juror starts with, be 0.
The point is, this is not possible. Then
34 Id.
3 MmMZ G RACISM IN JURY TRILS, supra note 28, at 90-91.
" Id. at 94.
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P (E I guilty)P(guilty E) = P (E)
with p = 0. But now, no matter what the evidence, there is no way
to get the posterior probability a person is guilty, the probability a
juror ends with, to be anything other than 0, because 0 multiplied
by any number is 0: "If the prisoner is to have a greater than zero
probability of guilt on the evidence, the calculus of change requires
that his prior probability of guilt must also be greater than zero."3
IV.
For example, the probability of a number's being prime, if
greater than 10 and less than 20 may be said-informally-to
be .5, because out of eight such numbers just four are primes.
-L. Jonathan Cohen 38
A short answer is, of course, one need not be a Bayesian about
this;319 but here a book by Cohen comes in: The Probable and the
Provable. "What is now the standard theory of probability," says
van Fraassen, "is very simple. A probability measure is a map of a
Borel field of sets into the real number interval [0, 1], with value
1 for the largest set, and this map is countably additive."' 0 That is,
one has a set of individuals, assigned weights. The probability of one
of them is its weight; the probability of a set of them is the sum of
the weights of the individuals in it. Cohen, although he gets off to a
bad start, as by the epigraph, renounces this approach, which he
disparages as 'mathematicist'.
It does not, he believes, apply at law, for six reasons.4 (1) In civil
" Cohen, Book Review, 1975 TIMES LITERARY Supp. 993 (I. HACKING, THE EMEROENCE OF
PROBABILITY).
L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 18 (1977). Cohen repeats the claim at 19.
The idea is, one sets up a test by which one rejects the hypothesis 'the defendant is
innocent' when it is true perhaps .1 of the time and, given this, also accepts it when it is false
as infrequently as possible. See Neyman, Frequentist Probability and Frequentist Statistics,
36 SYNTHESE 97 (1977).
40 van Fraassen, supra note 23, at 133.
L. COHEN, supra note 38, chs. 5-10.
[A] certain jovial King of France, making a progress through his kingdom, was re-
ceived at the gates of a provincial town by the mayor's deputy, who began his speech
on this wise: "May it please your Majesty, there are just thirteen reasons why His
Honour the Mayor can not be present to welcome you this morning. The first of these
reasons i that he is dead." On this the king graciously declared that this first reason
was sufficient, and that he would not trouble the mayor's deputy for the twelve others.
1 A. WHITE, A HISTORY OF THE WARFARE OF SCIENCE wIT THEOLOGY IN CHRISTENDOM 233 (1965)
(1st ed. 1896).
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cases, a plaintiff has to prove all aspects of his claim, but not with
probabilities sufficiently high that the product of them exceeds .5.
(2) Inferences on inferences are said (Cohen cites Wigmore) to be
bad things, so that a first inference must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt. (3) Sometimes, as when one'is run over by a bus but is
not able to identify the bus line, a probability by itself will not do.42
(4) In criminal cases, juries do not decide whether there is a reasona-
ble doubt by probabilities, as in part III, but by reasons for doubting
(Cohen's example: the shifty demeanor of a witness).-" (5) More
generally, no model of the mathematicist, e.g., the betting model,
seems appropriate to reasoning in law, even as aspiration; the math-
ematicist is obliged to come up with one. (6) As above, part II.
What Cohen is selling is something he calls 'inductive probabil-
ity', which goes like this: Suppose a hypothesis, 'All ravens are
black,' and n tests ti of it,
t, = observing a raven
t7 = observing a raven of each sex
t3 = observing a raven of each sex in each season
and so on. If the hypothesis- passes tj', it is supported to degree i/n;
the hypothesis 'Not all ravens are black', is unsupported."
Applied to law, the approach requires a plaintiff to support his
position, that is, show that his hypothesis, p, passes a test; the
probability of it is then positive; the probability of the defendant's
2See Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 317 Mass. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).
" Cohen gets into trouble here, as he does in the epigraph.
[Sluppose that there is expert evidence asserting the presence of just three mutually
independent peculiarities in the machine on which the letter was typed, and of just
the same three in A's machine. Suppose the expert evidence is that each of these
peculiarities is normally found, on average, in only one out of ten machines. Then, if
this evidence is correct, the mathematical probability of a typewriter's having all three
peculiarities will be .001; and the mathematical probability that any randomly se-
lected pair of typewriters have, independently of one another, all three peculiarities
will be one in a million. It is tempting thence to infer a .999,999 mathematical proba-
bility that the letter's having been typed on a machine with those peculiarities is
dependent on the fact that A has such a machine, and therefore apparently a .999,999
mathematical probability that A typed the letter.
L. CoHum, supra note 38, at 84. It is not tempting at all. Consider the airplane passenger who
brought a bomb because he was pretty sure it would not go off and reasoned that the prob-
ability of one bomb on a plane being p, the probability of two is p X p. This from my student,
Gil Walker, who helped elsewhere, too. See also People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d
33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (en banc).
" Ackermann, Book Review, 69 J. PHiL. 103 (1972); Kyburg, Book Review, 69 J. Pun. 106
(1972) (L. COHEN, THE IMPUCATIONS OF INDUcTION).
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hypothesis, not-p, is 0. The defendant must then show that his
hypothesis passes a higher test, so that the probability of his hy-
pothesis is positive and the probability of the plaintiff's hypothesis
0; or the defendant must at least offer evidence so that the probabil-
ities of both hypotheses are 0. Plainly, if probabilities are obtained
this way, it is not possible to decide what to do, as in part I, by
multiplying probabilities and satisfactions.
But if a probability is not to be used in a calculus of this kind, it
is not clear what good it is.
Mathematicist: So set the inductive probability of the un-
supported hypothesis, say not-p, at 0; but let the inductive
probability of p be perhaps the mathematical probability of p
minus the mathematical probability of not-p, so that inductive
probability may be translated into mathematical probability.
Inductivist: That's just the point. It can't be.
Mathematicist: But then why should jurors, say, pay any
attention to it? They must, at least implicitly, decide as in part
I, by expected satisfaction. "In the words of Edmund Morgan,
'How else can they think?'-at least think rationally."" If the
cash value of inductive probability is not mathematical proba-
bility, jurors might as well examine the entrails of chickens.
Inductivist: I don't know.
The dialogue might end this way. If it does not, perhaps it goes
on as follows.
Inductivist: My approach does not maximize (expected)
satisfaction as in part I. But it has institutional advantages,
e.g., everybody believes it to be fair:4" satisfaction may never-
theless be maximized by it.
Mathematicist: I am reminded of the utilitarian dilemma
by which a sheriff is required to frame an innocent person to
stop lynchings that will take place if a guilty person is not
found or believed to be found.47
" Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1070. Kaplan adds: "Despite the urging, indeed importuning,
of several delegations of law review editors, the author has been unable to discover when or
where Professor Morgan said this. In any event, the reader may rest assured that he did so."
Id. at 1070 n.6.
" Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HA1v. L. REV.
1329 (1971).
" See generally McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL. REv.
466 (1957).
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Or maybe satisfaction does not matter; but if it does not, again, it
is not evident what does.
But the mathematicist's position, unsupplemented, won't do ei-
ther. The trouble begins with the juror of part III, who, one recalls,
refused to presume Newton innocent: if innocent, what was he doing
there? Suppose a prosecuting attorney trying a case of assault
argues this way:
The accused is being tried for assault. Jurors convict for assault
if the probability the accused did it is at least .75.11 The prob-
ability an accused did it, as determined by judges, is .85.11
Therefore: one ought to convict.
And stops. The idea is, if what he says is true," and if the accused
does not add anything, society is better off if the accused is con-
victed. But the law does not permit this.
The problem is not only a legal one. One supposes of a coin one
knows nothing about that P (heads) = P (tails) = .5, but does so
uneasily. If one tosses it one hundred times and gets fifty heads and
fifty tails, one supposes the same thing, more easily.
In 1876, Stanley, back in Africa after finding Livingston, had with
Frank to decide whether to go down the Zambezi (south) or, more
dangerously, because it had not been done before, down the Congo
(north). "Finally, Frank came up with an idea: 'I say, sir, let us toss
up: best two out of three to decide it. . . .Heads for the north and
the Lualaba; tails for the south and Katanga.' "I' They did so, with
an improbable result. "Stanley gave Frank a rupee coin. The youth
flipped it; he flipped it in fact six times and six times it came up
tails for the south and Katanga."5 They went down the Congo any-
way, and Frank drowned in it.
How would six successive tails have changed the probabilities
associated with the coin? If they occurred on tosses 1-6, there be-
ing only six tosses, perhaps P (heads) = .2; P (tails) = .8. But if
they occurred on tosses 101-106, with tosses 1-100 as above, per-
haps P (heads) = P (tails) = .5 as before.
The difference is in the resiliency of the probabilities. Again
Simon & Mahan, supra note 5, at 328.
" Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. Ray. 1055, 1063.64 (1964).
o It is, but it doesn't quite fit. Judges require a probability of guilt of .88 to convict for
assault. Simon & Mahan, supra note 5, at 328. Jurors believe .69 of persons tried are guilty.
Kalven, supra note 49, at 1064.
p. FoRBATH, TaE RiVm CONGO 294 (1977).
Id. See also T. STOPPARD, RosENKRAmz AND Gun F STEIW ARE DEAD (1968).
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somewhat ideally, all of us have belief states, functions from sent-
ences of our language to probabilities of the truth of them. These
states change, as when we find out a sentence, that is, the truth of
it, has probability 1 and adjust probabilities of other sentences in
light of this. The resiliency of the probability of a sentence with
respect to a set of sentences is defined as 1 minus the greatest
difference between the probability of this sentence to begin with and
its probabilities obtained by alternately taking each of the sentences
in the set to have probability 1. (Then the resiliencies of both
P (heads) and P (tails) are .7 and 1 for the sets of sentences I'Tosses
1-6 are tails.'l and I'Tosses 101-106 are tails.') respectively.)13
What is wrong with the way the prosecuting attorney argues
above, and also, I believe, with the case against the bus company, 4
is that the probabilities of guilt and responsibility, respectively,
even if high, are not resilient enough: they change very substantially
if the belief states with which they are associated are changed by
taking, as is plausible, obviously pertinent sentences, for instance,
'The person assaulted says, "The accused didn't do it."', to have
probability 1. I do not know how high resiliency ought to be, or what
sentences ought to be in the set by which one determines resiliency.
The point, though, is that Cohen discards where he should supple-
ment. Mathematical probabilities matter; it is just that they are not
all that matter.
V.
Sir, the law is as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever
since the law began; and we have several set forms which are
held as law, and so held and used for good reason, though we
cannot at present remember that reason.
-Chief Justice Fortescue5
The strategy Cohen adopts is that of showing that proof at law is
by inductive probability. (For instance, as to the first of the six
reasons that mathematical probability does not apply at law,5" i.e.,
that a plaintiff has to prove all aspects of his case but just barely,
he says, if every part of a plaintiff's case has a positive inductive
probability, the conjunction of the parts has too; but the denial of
51 Skyrms, Resiliency, Propensities, and Causal Necessity, 74 J. PHIL. 704 (1977).
, See text accompanying note 42 supra.
Y.B. 36 Hen. 6, 25b-26 (1458).
s' See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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the conjunction of the parts has probability 0.) As I see it, on the
other hand, a theory of probability is not just descriptive, the point
of it is not merely to model the way one reasons at law; it is norma-
tive and, if necessary, revisionary.
As a place to start, procedures of proof at law were once different
from what they are now.
The German laws refer to cases in which a woman might de-
mand justice of a man personally in the lists, and not only are
instances on record in which this was done, as in a case at
Berne in 1228, in which the woman was the victor, but it was
of sufficiently frequent occurrence to have an established mode
of procedure, which is preserved to us in all its details by illu-
minated MSS. of the period. The chances between such une-
qual adversaries were adjusted by placing the man up to the
navel in a pit three feet wide, tying his left hand behind his
back, and arming him only with a club, while his fair opponent
had the free use of her limbs and was furnished with a stone
as large as the fist, or weighing from one to five pounds, fas-
tened in a piece of stuff. A curious regulation provided the man
with three clubs. If in delivering a blow he touched the earth
with hand or arm he forfeited one of the clubs; if this happened
thrice his last weapon was gone, he was adjudged defeated, and
the woman could order his execution. On the other hand, the
woman was similarly furnished with three weapons. If she
struck the man while he was disarmed she forfeited one, and
with the loss of the third she was at his mercy, and was liable
to be buried alive. According to the customs of Freisingen,
these combats were reserved for accusations of rape. If the man
was vanquished, he was beheaded; if the woman, she only lost
a hand, for the reason that the chances of the fight were against
her.?
In part, this has less to do with proof than with efforts to restrict
resort to force, independent of a concern to adjudicate. But wager
of battle was a way to get at truth, too: champions of equal prowess
were chosen so that God's testimony might more easily be re-
ceived;5 by his loss the loser became "a convicted perjuror."5' (This
aspect of truth-seeking is unadulterated in the ordeal.)
Lea, The Wager of Battle, in LAw AND WARFAR 233, 244 (P. Bohannan ed. 1967).
58H. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE 149 (2d ed. rev. 1870).
' 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 600 (2d ed. 1898).
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It is not as though while this was going on there was a system of
probabilistic adjudication, as in part I, that courts were conscious
of but chose not to use. There simply was no concept of probability
in our sense before 1654. The word 'probability' was used before
then with a different meaning, now dropped. In 363, the Emperor
Julian fought his way into Persia and died there at thirty-two, fight-
ing without armor. His successor, Jovian, less effectual, his army ill-
supplied, by treaty gave up five provinces to get out. Gibbon re-
marks: "According to Rufinus, an immediate supply of provisions
was stipulated by the treaty, and Theodoret affirms that the obliga-
tion was faithfully discharged by the Persians. Such a fact is proba-
ble, but undoubtedly false.""0 By this use something can be both
probable and false. "The old medieval probability was a matter of
opinion. An opinion was probable if it was approved by ancient
authority, or at least was well testified to." 1
Thesis. The job of the jury has always been to establish probabil-
ity, but it has done this in two radically disparate ways. (1) By
making probable what it determines happened. Pollock and Mait-
land: "That in old times 'the jurors were the witnesses'-this doc-
trine has in our own days become a commonplace.""2 The casualness
about how jurors went about being witnesses suggests that the pur-
pose of the jury was less to determine what happened than to make
what it determined happened probable in the old (testimonial)
sense. It still does-I suggest, vestigially. Others, for instance Tribe,
if I understand him, believe it ought to go on doing so and not do
much else.6
(2) By establishing, in a different sense, that of 'finding out',
what probably happened. Langbein: "The English substitute for the
judgment of God was the petty jury, an institution that retained
something of the 'inscrutability' of the ordeals"; he criticizes it as
"so crude that torture was unnecessary." 4 As I understand him, he
takes the purpose of the jury to be to get at probability in the new
1 E. GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 835 n.116
(Modem Library n.d.) (1st ed. 1776-1788). Cicero has: "Atque illud est probabilius, neque
tamen verum, quod Socrates dicere solebat, omnes in eo, quod scirent, satis esse eloquentes."
DE ORATORE, in 3 CICERO I.xiv.63. This gets translated: "What Socrates used to say, namely,
that all men were sufficiently eloquent in the field they knew, has some probability, but no
truth." THE SOCRATC ENIGMA 28 (H. Spiegelberg ed. 1964). Spiegelberg doesn't give the date
of the translation.
$I I. HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILIY 43-44 (1975).
,2 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 59, at 622.
13 Tribe, supra note 46.
" J. LANOBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 77 (1977) (quoting T. PLUCKNErT, EDwARD
I AND CRIMINAL LAw 75 (1960)).
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(mathematical) sense and believes, justifiably, that in the begin-
ning it did not do this very well. I think it was not then supposed
to, but is now.
(1) and (2) are related like this. About 1660, "[a] new kind of
testimony was accepted: the testimony of nature which, like any
authority, was to be read."1 For the law, (1) and (2) are related
partly by pun. If a jury reasons, it ought to do it right, i.e., by
mathematical probabilities. But its role in (1) is mostly ritualistic.
As to Cohen, the concept of inductive probability, I think, simply
conflates (1) and (2), doing badly by both.
" 1. HACKING, supra note 61, at 44.
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